I sent off a version of the following as a letter to the RAF News a while back, and have yet to recieve a reply for some reason. It will be interesting to hear other peoples opinions on the contents.I]
I was pleased to see the letter from Sgt Mark Clay in issue 1136 of the RAF News, I’m sure his comments are welcomed by many, his point about the low morale of many personnel within the ground trades should cause concern. In recent months many have been affected by E2E Studies, Leaning and amalgamation, no doubt more will be, either by loss of individual posts, whole sections, or by leaving the service due to redundancy or natural wastage. The changes occurring within most ground trades vary from mild to traumatic, the rapidity of some of these changes in the interest of saving money does smack of knee jerk reactions to political or monetary pressure, it’s only a matter of time before a few baby’s get thrown out with the bathwater.
My reason for putting pen to paper is to ask if/when the people who have made all the changes to date are to be ‘leaned’, namely the management structure and the officer corps. The collocation of the two Command Headquarters may see a reduction of manpower by 1000, but most of this manpower will be civilians who are no longer needed when one Headquarters closes. Interesting debates will no doubt follow if this letter is published; here are a few points to ponder.
Why are there 11,115 officers between the rank of Group Captain and Pilot Officer? This figure includes aircrew, who are obviously needed, yet 1166 of the 3762 Flying branch posts are non-flying duties. In the other branch posts there are 414 Group Captains, 1341 Wing Commanders, 2337 Squadron Leaders and 3263 Flight Lieutenants and below. The figures quoted above are from the RAF Appointments Register, and can be found easily enough, not included in this list is the number of officers in training or holding awaiting a posting. How many of these posts can be justifiably classed as essential cogs in the machine required to produce a cost effective operational force? The ratio of executive officers per operational airframe must cause some raised eyebrows in Whitehall; add all the pay, gratuities and pensions together over 10 years and you can easily afford a few more Typhoons or JCA’s. Why can’t some of the posts occupied by junior officers be filled by Warrant Officers or Flt Sgts who have years of experience in their field? I have found no information on the number of serving Air Officers, but judging by the amount of Group Captains on the books this number must be high.
The career structure of the officer corps can also be improved upon, why is it that officers only do 2-year tours; can this be classed as good value for money? The methods used in End to End studies is to compare the work done to a large factory, using phrases such as ‘customer’, ‘product’ and ‘materials’; continuing the theme, any civilian company worth it’s salt would bend over backwards to keep a good manager in place, and would act quickly to move on or dismiss the worst. A two year tour gives little time for development, the first six months learning the job and getting to know people leaves just 18 months of actual productivity. Officers who excel within a certain post move on all too soon, often to an area that bears little or no relationship to the post they leave behind. With competent NCOs shouldering the burden a less adept manager can keep a low profile for 2 years relatively easily. A four year tour will allow the better officer to shine through career-wise, and allow the less competent to be seen for what they are and, hopefully, correct their failings. Other benefits would be increased stability for the individual, not to mention a reduction in training and movement costs.
I read with interest the article by ACM Sir Brian Burridge in issue 1,135 of the RAF News entitled ‘RAF is adapting to new challenges’, where he made some interesting comments on the changes to the structure of the RAF currently being undertaken. He concluded by saying ‘we need a relevant Air Force; that’s relevant operationally, and relevant in an economic or a value for money sense.’ Adding ‘We need fewer, but more adaptable people.’ I have served over 26 years and like Sgt Clay have seen many changes, from the end of the Cold War to today’s E2E; adaptability and the good old 'can do' attitude have been bywords that have been applied to airmen throughout. Speaking as an engineer we have seen the demise of the Flight Line Mechanic, Direct Entrant technician and the Apprentice, the Mech(Mech) and Mech(Tech) system quickly replaced with the SAC Tech causing the loss of the J/T rank, amalgamation of TG1 trades and the re-introduction of the Flight Line Mechanic in the form of the AMM. One area that has never changed in this time is the way the officer corps functions, and to my knowledge no one has looked into it’s efficiency and effectiveness; with the future manning of the RAF giving a ratio of almost 1 officer for 2 airmen perhaps it’s time to do so now.
In the late 80’s it was said that you could get the whole of the RAF into Wembley, nowadays everyone would fit into the average Division 1 ground; but if seats were allocated by status the terraces would look empty, whilst the VIP boxes would be packed solid.
I was pleased to see the letter from Sgt Mark Clay in issue 1136 of the RAF News, I’m sure his comments are welcomed by many, his point about the low morale of many personnel within the ground trades should cause concern. In recent months many have been affected by E2E Studies, Leaning and amalgamation, no doubt more will be, either by loss of individual posts, whole sections, or by leaving the service due to redundancy or natural wastage. The changes occurring within most ground trades vary from mild to traumatic, the rapidity of some of these changes in the interest of saving money does smack of knee jerk reactions to political or monetary pressure, it’s only a matter of time before a few baby’s get thrown out with the bathwater.
My reason for putting pen to paper is to ask if/when the people who have made all the changes to date are to be ‘leaned’, namely the management structure and the officer corps. The collocation of the two Command Headquarters may see a reduction of manpower by 1000, but most of this manpower will be civilians who are no longer needed when one Headquarters closes. Interesting debates will no doubt follow if this letter is published; here are a few points to ponder.
Why are there 11,115 officers between the rank of Group Captain and Pilot Officer? This figure includes aircrew, who are obviously needed, yet 1166 of the 3762 Flying branch posts are non-flying duties. In the other branch posts there are 414 Group Captains, 1341 Wing Commanders, 2337 Squadron Leaders and 3263 Flight Lieutenants and below. The figures quoted above are from the RAF Appointments Register, and can be found easily enough, not included in this list is the number of officers in training or holding awaiting a posting. How many of these posts can be justifiably classed as essential cogs in the machine required to produce a cost effective operational force? The ratio of executive officers per operational airframe must cause some raised eyebrows in Whitehall; add all the pay, gratuities and pensions together over 10 years and you can easily afford a few more Typhoons or JCA’s. Why can’t some of the posts occupied by junior officers be filled by Warrant Officers or Flt Sgts who have years of experience in their field? I have found no information on the number of serving Air Officers, but judging by the amount of Group Captains on the books this number must be high.
The career structure of the officer corps can also be improved upon, why is it that officers only do 2-year tours; can this be classed as good value for money? The methods used in End to End studies is to compare the work done to a large factory, using phrases such as ‘customer’, ‘product’ and ‘materials’; continuing the theme, any civilian company worth it’s salt would bend over backwards to keep a good manager in place, and would act quickly to move on or dismiss the worst. A two year tour gives little time for development, the first six months learning the job and getting to know people leaves just 18 months of actual productivity. Officers who excel within a certain post move on all too soon, often to an area that bears little or no relationship to the post they leave behind. With competent NCOs shouldering the burden a less adept manager can keep a low profile for 2 years relatively easily. A four year tour will allow the better officer to shine through career-wise, and allow the less competent to be seen for what they are and, hopefully, correct their failings. Other benefits would be increased stability for the individual, not to mention a reduction in training and movement costs.
I read with interest the article by ACM Sir Brian Burridge in issue 1,135 of the RAF News entitled ‘RAF is adapting to new challenges’, where he made some interesting comments on the changes to the structure of the RAF currently being undertaken. He concluded by saying ‘we need a relevant Air Force; that’s relevant operationally, and relevant in an economic or a value for money sense.’ Adding ‘We need fewer, but more adaptable people.’ I have served over 26 years and like Sgt Clay have seen many changes, from the end of the Cold War to today’s E2E; adaptability and the good old 'can do' attitude have been bywords that have been applied to airmen throughout. Speaking as an engineer we have seen the demise of the Flight Line Mechanic, Direct Entrant technician and the Apprentice, the Mech(Mech) and Mech(Tech) system quickly replaced with the SAC Tech causing the loss of the J/T rank, amalgamation of TG1 trades and the re-introduction of the Flight Line Mechanic in the form of the AMM. One area that has never changed in this time is the way the officer corps functions, and to my knowledge no one has looked into it’s efficiency and effectiveness; with the future manning of the RAF giving a ratio of almost 1 officer for 2 airmen perhaps it’s time to do so now.
In the late 80’s it was said that you could get the whole of the RAF into Wembley, nowadays everyone would fit into the average Division 1 ground; but if seats were allocated by status the terraces would look empty, whilst the VIP boxes would be packed solid.
DT_Xtremez_06:
