I know what i'm letting myself in for... but here goes anyway...

[skevans]

You are quite right.

Woodvale, Colerne, Wyton and (another station that escapes me at the moment) all operate a three man watch at category 1A. These units are all allocated to university air squadrons flying the Grob Tutor.

Having witnessed the devastating affect that a Chipmunk can have in a crash situation, I don't belive that these airfields are staffed correctly to deal with the what if it hits xyz scenario.

However, every aircraft is categorised according to various concepts in firefighting, and for the RAF this is the critical area concept. Sadly for those of us who would like more blue suits around the critical area concept directs that a certain ammount of media must be available, and not the personnel to operate the fire vehicles / perform rescues, and that it actually falls below that for the establishement of RAF posts.

 

[alanpartridge]

Totally agree with the critical area concept for firefighting, but even if there is not a complication like the aircraft hitting xyz scenario, mmmf and decontam comes in to the equation every time.

The fact is that three men (with two in BA) simply can not safely handle a protracted incident with out the rapid back up from LAFB, which can not be guaranteed

This dilemma has been flagged up to the lords and masters many times and the simplified reply is to "stay defensive".... Good book answer! But is it realistic??

 

[firestorm]

The fact is that three men (with two in BA) simply can not safely handle a protracted incident with out the rapid back up from LAFB, which can not be guaranteed

This dilemma has been flagged up to the lords and masters many times and the simplified reply is to "stay defensive".... Good book answer! But is it realistic??

A 3 man crew would just be able to effect an initial rescue but, in my eyes, is outside standard safe operations with BA. I'm not sure why you can't rely on back up from the LAFB though, or do you mean rapid back up from LAFB?

 

[skevans]

Totally agree with the critical area concept for firefighting, but even if there is not a complication like the aircraft hitting xyz scenario, mmmf and decontam comes in to the equation every time.

The fact is that three men (with two in BA) simply can not safely handle a protracted incident with out the rapid back up from LAFB, which can not be guaranteed

This dilemma has been flagged up to the lords and masters many times and the simplified reply is to "stay defensive".... Good book answer! But is it realistic??

Risk management is a term that we have all had to come to terms with. In a nutshell it is based on the probability of an event occuring and the likely outcome of the event.

The four cat 1A stations all operate Grob Tutors and the likelihood of a blunt impact crash must be considered as quite low by the powers that be. After all there have only been two 'lost or badly damaged' since they began service around nine years ago. One was, I believe, caused by an arguement with a vehicle which neither side won, the other incident is quoted below.

'The only major incident so far in its RAF service occurred in June 2004, when a Tutor operated by Southampton UAS lost a propellor blade and its canopy in flight. The aircraft was landed unpowered in a field, where damage was also sustained to the undercarriage. Both pilots were uninjured. Subsequent investigation revealed cracking in the propellor blade roots across the fleet, which was grounded for several months as urgent modifications were made.'

Given the size of the aircraft and its related critical area, the aircraft safety record, the small fuel load, lack of weapons, lack of ejection seats, Lox, Gox etc then the probability is quite high that 3 men should be able to deal with what is in effect likely to be a small scale incident, not a protracted one.

The provision of three trained firefighters with a vehicle and equipment for Tutor operations on RAF airfields is in fact quite generous. The CAA would only require a 'competent person' to be available for this category of aircraft.

Whilst I understand your concerns regarding CAAM's in all their forms, it must be clearly understood that there has been no study that is able to clearly identify what hazard they may present in a fire situation. CAAM's are all around us, not just in aircraft. They can be found in cars, trains, boats, clothing, sports equipment and many other everyday items. They are also not a new thing in aviation, it is widely known that vintage aircraft from WW2 also contain CAAM's. Perhaps one of the uses of CAAM's that you may be more familiar with are motor sports cars. Yet despite the identical nature of the materials to for instance the Harrier GR7, you will still see a race marshall in a nomex suit tackle an onboard fire with no repiratory protection, or decontamination.

 

[skevans]

A 3 man crew would just be able to effect an initial rescue but, in my eyes, is outside standard safe operations with BA.

I'm with you there buddy, but without going through the whole arguement again (because it bores me!) the use of BA rapid entry procedures would be adequate in this situation, provided the incident commander instigated a higher level of control as soon as reasonably practical, and if still required.

 

[alanpartridge]

Skevans,

Again, I agree with you and I'm fully aware of all the applications of composites in every day use around us, including the fishing rod I had as a kid. The problem is that the MOD issue the Op Directives and we have to adhere to them (contamination, decontamination, etc even if there is just a break up of the arframe and no fire) whether it is over the top or not. If we didn't, the BoI might say so otherwise!

The MOD are fully aware of the safety implications of a three man watch (particually after Ternhill), which is why the new impending JSP 426 lays down that cat 1A will consist of four men. My original point (and gripe!) was that this has been on the cards for years but is still not happening, due to funding, contractual obligations, unions, etc.

As you know, the CAA and other agencies have completely different procedures and do not recognise the hazard to the same extent, which is why they don't even require a professional crew on duty for the equivalent risk.

Firestorm,

I meant rapid back up from the LAFB to assist with ops and decontam, should there be anything other than an initial rescue.

Thanks.

 

[skevans]

Skevans,

Again, I agree with you and I'm fully aware of all the applications of composites in every day use around us, including the fishing rod I had as a kid. The problem is that the MOD issue the Op Directives and we have to adhere to them (contamination, decontamination, etc even if there is just a break up of the arframe and no fire) whether it is over the top or not. If we didn't, the BoI might say so otherwise!

The MOD are fully aware of the safety implications of a three man watch (particually after Ternhill), which is why the new impending JSP 426 lays down that cat 1A will consist of four men. My original point (and gripe!) was that this has been on the cards for years but is still not happening, due to funding, contractual obligations, unions, etc.

As you know, the CAA and other agencies have completely different procedures and do not recognise the hazard to the same extent, which is why they don't even require a professional crew on duty for the equivalent risk.

Firestorm,

I meant rapid back up from the LAFB to assist with ops and decontam, should there be anything other than an initial rescue.

Thanks.

Mr partridge. You are new to the e-goat and so let me please explain that as the only regular RAF firefighter contibutor, my views are constant, unabridged and completely without any biased towards the scum bag maggots who deliver policy, not my next beer!

As a DF&RS or contracted employee you will no doubt be aware of your contractual obliations to the MoD, some of which exceed normal service channels.

The MoD directive that, I presume, you speak of is simply that, a directive. It is not Law, regulation, or accepted procedure. It is simply an in house method to mitigate the risk.

One day it will be proven whether CAAM's present a risk or not, and until then we wil be ignorant and therefore only able to mitigate the risk in the most immediate form possible.

Rule of fours anyone ?

 

[alanpartridge]

The MoD directive that, I presume, you speak of is simply that, a directive. It is not Law, regulation, or accepted procedure. It is simply an in house method to mitigate the risk.

I always thought that an Operational Directive was just that - a directive for accepted operational procedures.

Oh well, I will file 13 all of them (including 1/04 AL April06) and ask DFRMO HQ not to send any more.

 

[skevans]

I'm not sure when you were last at CTE but many of the directives spewing forward from DFRMO are not even implemented there in the training environment, let alone across the defence estate.

From my own travels to each of the stations staffed by RAF firefighters I know that the directive is implemented differently dependant on many factors, most notable of which is the number of firefighters available.

Perhaps things could be implemented in a standardised and properly documented fashion if -
1. The 'directives' didn't conflict with each other.
2. They were written or at least tested by operational fire crews, not DFRMO senior officers sat at Andover.
3. The findings of BOI's were finally implemented. Remember the Bruggen Tornado incident in the early 1990's? some of the BOI recomendations still haven't materialised.
4. They should be based on fact, and that will only come from properly funded research.